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Abstract: Complying with privacy in multi-jurisdictional health domains is important as well as challenging. The compliance 
management process will not be efficient unless it manages to show evidences of explicit verification of legal requirements. In 
order to achieve this goal, privacy compliance should be addressed through “a privacy by design” approach. This paper 
presents an approach to privacy protection verification by means of a novel audit framework. It aims to allow privacy auditors 
to look at past events of data processing effectuated by healthcare organisation and verify compliance to legal privacy 
requirements. The adapted approach used semantic modelling and a semantic reasoning layer that could be placed on top of 
hospital databases. These models allow the integration of fine-grained context information about the sharing of patient data 
and provide an explicit capturing of applicable privacy obligation.  This is particularly helpful for insuring a seamless data 
access logging and an effective compliance checking during audit trials.  
 





Privacy protection in geographically distributed 
healthcare and medical research systems is subject to 
policies dictated by conflicting jurisdictions and 
legislations [8] [24], [37]. Enforcing these policies at 
system level is necessary but does not provide sufficient 
guarantees to privacy protection [7]. Indeed, there is a 
tremendous need to audit privacy compliance in order to 
enhance social acceptance of these systems. To achieve 
this goal, we need to incorporate better privacy 
assurance mechanisms that would let patients across the 
European Union (EU) benefit from both enhanced 
healthcare strategies and better medical research 
outcome while having less concerns about their privacy 
[34]. It is therefore essential to adopt mechanisms 
ensuring the robustness of privacy enforcement 
processes and proofs that the systems managing patient 
data can provide further assurance to the enforcement. 
We believe this could be achieved through the 
monitoring and auditing of past data sharing events 
within the healthcare context. In this paper, we 
contribute to the field of privacy compliance 
technologies by presenting a novel mechanism that 
allows an auditor to audit the compliance with privacy 
regulation within healthcare IT Systems. This is by 
allowing them to check the validity of a set of privacy 
guidelines given to the user against a set of formal data 
sharing policies previously enforced at data access run 
time. First, our proposed framework can capture the 
characteristics of a previous event of data manipulation 
recorded in an audit log. It can then generate a set of 
privacy rules related to the event in question and finally 
measures the users’ compliance to the identified set of 
rules. In fact, despite all automation, the risk of 
breaching patient privacy continues to exist, 
particularly, in the context of health data management. 
This could be linked to the usage of exception-based 
access to data, which allow users to bypass system 
controls due to emergency cases and other unforeseen 
reasons [12], [39], and [23]. In addition, system 
controls might be hacked or twisted by intruders when 
the systems are exposed to Internet and cyber security 
risks [48]. The risk could also be related to the simple 
reason of system failures. Hence, introducing audit and 
governance mechanisms is highly required when 
deploying healthcare computer applications. In this 
context, the guidelines provided to the user should 
match the constraints that have been initially tested for 
conformance at access control run time.  These efforts 
involve reviewing all users’ past data sharing events 
and the permissions they were granted in each data 
usage attempt. However, these reviews are extremely 
costly and difficult in the absence of an automated 
solution.  
The ideas in this paper are structured as follows: 
Section 2 sets the background through a study of some 
related work.  Section 3 presents our compliance 
checking approach; in particular, we explain here the 
different functionalities offered by the compliance 
framework. Afterwards, the system architecture is 
 
presented in Section 4 and a grounding scenario is 
presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the paper 
results and contribution with relation to state-of-the-art 
work in the field of systemic healthcare privacy 
compliance auditing. Finally, the paper conclusions are 
presented in Section 7. 
 
2. Background and Related Work 
Privacy is considered of high priority for compliance, 
mainly for disciplines that rely on the processing of 
personal data to achieve success. In Europe most 
member states have specific legislations to rely on for 
issues related to citizen’s privacy. But these legislations 
were divergent and presented potential conflicts 
regarding a free flow of information across Europe. The 
European commission realized the need for the 
harmonization of data protection legislations within 
Europe and published the EU 95/46/EC Directive on the 
protection of personal data in 1995 (EC, 1995). By May 
25, 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) came to supersede the Data Protection 
Directive and become national law for all EU Member 
States. The GDPR has rather more global scope and has 
brought to obligation more specific data protection 
requirements, stiffer enforcement as well as non-
compliance penalties [15]. 
As an impact of major digital transformation, many 
healthcare IT systems now highly involve the use of 
patient data including medical heath records, medical 
images or even information about patient lifestyle, which 
could be shared through cloud services. This data falls 
within a special category of personal data [44] which is 
sensitive data as specified and defined by privacy 
legislation. Policy makers in the field of healthcare, have 
made a great effort to balance between the limited use of 
such category of data for the general public good and the 
protection of patient privacy and autonomy. From a 
technical and an operational perspective, privacy is 
considered as the main challenge for security developers 
working on large scale integrated healthcare systems. 
The analysis made in [44] showed that no future for such 
technology if the legal requirements are not carefully 
implemented in large and heterogenous health IT 
infrastructures. Moreover, the increasing complexity of 
electronic patient records raises a requirement for forms 
of mandatory access control. Different parts of each 
patient’s medical records should be accessible by 
varying sets of people: administrative staff, nurses, 
general practitioners, specialists. For purposes of 
epidemiology and other research, anonymised or 
pseudonymised records should be available. In addition, 
the management of genetic data introduces more 
problems and difficulties due to the potential re-
identification of data.  Although attempts are being made 
to keep the access rules simple, issues of consent implied 
that some detailed fine-grained rules are required. If an 
element of a patient record is stored in an encrypted 
form, the decrypted form should only be available to 
individuals in selected roles, and where suitable facilities 
for recordkeeping and audit exist. Intelligent audit 
systems need to be put in place to prevent a clinician 
receiving sensitive information from passing it to a 
third party. At the moment, no strong mechanisms exist 
to enforce these requirements. As a result, the UK 
(National Health System) NHS, for example, uses large 
separated networks, which drives up costs, and can 
nevertheless not give strong guarantees of separation 
and complete audit [47]. 
We believe that an effective and useful way of 
contributing to the problem of data governance and 
privacy compliance in our context is by working on the 
integration of both business strategies and automated 
processes responsible for specifying and managing 
organizational policies. It is important that harmony 
and unification of these both components are 
optimized. It is highly recommended for organizations 
to start thinking about minimizing dependency on 
manpower for compliance management tasks and 
saving money and time by adopting automated 
solutions. However, reaching a parallelism between the 
organizational high-level policies and its operational 
processes is still a challenge to be dealt with. For all 
healthcare IT environments; where personal data is 
subject to processing or sharing, it is important and 
necessary for audit trials to continue to operate; both 
externally and internally in order to detect occurrences 
where a mismatch between policies and processes is 
obvious. In addition, this is also important in order to 
continuously trace for breaches of regulations not only 
when claims are made and compensations are required. 
The ability to proactively trace the access and 
disclosure of personal data is also essential in 
maintaining an effective compliance program [2]. 
The literature includes some works focusing on 
approaches to automated compliance auditing. As an 
early stage work we cite for example Hippocratic 
Databases (HDB) Compliance Auditing [2] which was 
extended thereafter in [14] and in [20]. This approach 
allows enterprises to log information about past queries 
in the form of metadata constituting a database log. 
Auditors could therefore track past data usage attempts 
by relying on the query log where information such as: 
the identity of users who have accessed a particular 
item, the date and time of queries, the purpose of access 
and the final recipients of the information could be 
determined. Moreover, Hippocratic Databases 
Compliance Auditing adopts a way of auditing 
disclosures by relevance ranking which is based on 
tracking the origin of sensitive data that was subject to 
misuse by comparing it to the outputs of past queries 
saved in the backlog [17]. The query with high 
similarity to the disclosed data will have the high 
relevance rank. Similarity is calculated though specific 
proximity measures [17]. HDB along with other work 
such as that in [18] have recently tackled the issue of 
databases compliance audit, have undoubtedly greatly 
enhance the accountability of database systems by 
allowing enterprise to save past events of data access in 
order to verify its compliance with high level policies. 
However, by adopting these approaches the task of 
compliance verification will continue to involve heavy 
 
human-based verification. This is because the proposed 
solution does not incorporate mechanisms to 
automatically evaluate the handling of specific, fine-
grained legal requirements. Regulatory compliance is 
very much related to vocabularies, meanings and 
interpretations [6], [22], [29]. It is therefore meaningful 
and necessary to adopt an approach that looks at the   
integration of semantics in the way privacy policies are 
specified and enforced.  This will facilitate the validation 
of formal data usage policies against regulations that are 
written in natural languages.  
In relation with semantic policy-based compliance 
checking, the work in [41], [4], and [28] provides a 
solution to some aspect of compliance auditing. The 
work focuses on the adaptation of semantic rules 
dictating requirements of compliance applicable to a 
given security domain with another set of rules referring 
to another security domain. This work is more useful 
when tackling the problem of policy interoperability in 
heterogeneous domains. For example, in order to check 
whether the policies adopted respectively by an 
organization A and an organization B are compliant, the 
structure of the rules in both sets (the reference set and 
the target set) are supposed to be similar. In our case the 
policy compliance checking approach is designed to 
make a map check compliance between two sets of rules 
that have different structures and used for different 
purposes: one to indicate requirements of compliance 
and the other is used to enforce compliance while 
inferring access control decisions and obligations.  In 
other terms, we are testing whether the requirements 
generated by one set of rules are satisfied by the other set 
of enforcement rules. The works in [4], [28] build on 
other previous works in [41], [31], [29]. It suggests the 
use of fuzzy sets theory in order to deal with limitation 
of The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) for 
modelling uncertainty and dealing with missing 
compliance information in rule-based policy 
specification.  Moreover, in relation to auditing 
compliance in business processes, the work in [36], [33] 
encodes business process models into semantically-
annotated digraphs then defines ways of measuring 
proximity relation of the process to another process 
predefined as compliant. It also provides mechanisms 
that use compliant process models and compliance 
patterns based on heuristic guidelines for detecting and 
resolving non-compliant processes. 
As previous studies in the same context, we have 
described in [29], [31] how semantic web technologies 
were used to classify the resources that we would like to 
protect. At that stage the resources were specified using 
the metadata captured within a privacy and data 
protection ontology we have designed and implemented. 
We also showed how different scenarios of data/resource 
sharing are modelled within the same ontology. In [30], 
we described extensions to the previous model (with 
necessary metadata added) and extend the data sharing 
scenarios to include privacy policy contexts applied to 
particular medical or healthcare scenarios. We then 
showed how this allows a better specification and 
enforcement of security and authorisation policies in 
the context of cloud computing as described in [5], [6]. 
This work did not stop at the control of access to data, 
but has rather focussed on ways of controlling any type 
of data usage even after the data were shared with a 
party belonging to an external domain. In addition, the 
work allowed the disclosure of data handling policies 
to external parties receiving personal data. In [45] we 
have developed models for sensitive data discovery in 
hospital business processes. The management of patient 
data is therefore easy to govern by applying GDPR and 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) rules as shown in [46]. Moreover, details on 
the ontology-driven relational query formulation using 
the semantic and assertional capabilities of OWL-DL 
are presented in [32]. In this paper we look at how to 
make healthcare IT systems more self-disciplined and 
trustworthy by integrating a privacy audit dimension to 
patient data management services.  
3. The Compliance Checking Approach 
Our previous work as presented in [29] and [30] has 
resulted in the production of models of data sharing 
along with abilities to generate and record legal 
requirements for privacy protection. Moreover, it 
included the ability to assess the context presented by 
each case of sharing and generates applicable access 
control permissions and obligations at the time the 
sharing request is submitted for validation to an access 
control decision-making system. In this paper, we are 
taking this work further by including an automated 
framework allowing auditors to test for compliance 
between heterogeneous domain (eHealth cloud 
domain)’s high-level policies and their enforced 
privacy preserving controls. This solution helps to 
verify that the data usage decisions taken by the 
adopted security middleware are in-line with the 
requirements and guidelines dictated by the 
organizational policies. We would like to highlight 
again the fact that we only deal with requirements and 
obligations that have been considered for enforcement 
through a policy-based approach. Our approach 
suggests benefiting from the contextual information 
and past data sharing events recorded in our ontology 
in order to allow an auditor to track many useful 
information including: (1) an instance of data sharing 
that has previously been executed by the system 
described based on specific models capturing all 
required context information; (2) the set of privacy 
requirements applicable for the instance of data sharing 
in question and also (3) the disclosure authorisation 
decision the system made at run time. Afterwards, the 
system could then automatically check if a compliant 
case was in place the time the actual sharing was 
authorised in the past. This is effectuated through an 
automated mapping, using a rule-based approach 
between the data sharing context information and the 
privacy requirements interpreted from the legislation. 
We end up with two possibilities either (1) the 
 
requirements were satisfied; therefore, the system 
reports a compliant data sharing to the auditor.  Or (2) 
the system indicates that alternative proof of compliance 
is required. Hence the auditor pursuits investigating 
compliance of the data-sharing event as described in 
Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1. Compliance Auditing Model. 
 
For the logging of past data sharing events, we aim to 
use a medical data sharing ontology as an audit trail log, 
which is explained in forthcoming sections. For future, 
we are already extending this to systematically link our 
ontology to a relational database. This will allow real 
time usage of our framework. 
3.1 Illustrative Scenario 
We describe the features of the compliance checking 
framework with an example from healthcare. This 
example presents a “data sharing” scenario where the 
data is shared between two nodes of a European 
HealthGrid infrastructure. It involves the sharing of a 
patient mammogram collected in the Breast Cancer 
Screening programme at a UK hospital from a patient 
“Mrs. White” for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment. 
Mrs. White has provided her consent at the time of 
collection. “Dr House” the radiologist who is taking 
responsibility for Mrs. White’s case needs a second 
opinion from “Dr Casa” a colleague at an Italian 
hospital. The mammogram cannot be fully anonymised 
before sending, as some personal data about Mrs. White 
are necessary in order to make an accurate judgment 
about treatment plan. Analysing the legal context of this 
sharing scenario we note that the mammogram is to be 
shared for a different but compatible purpose with the 
original purpose of collection. Recalling the statement in 
article 6(b) of the European Data Protection Directive 
that: “Personal data must be collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. 
Further processing of data for historical, statistical or 
scientific purposes shall not be considered as 
incompatible provided that Member States provide 
appropriate safeguards”, then in order to comply with 
the purpose compatibility principle we must check that 
the following conditions are satisfied before allowing the 
sharing: 
 
• If the mammogram was collected for a specified, 
explicit and legitimate purpose.  
• If the secondary purpose is compatible with the 
original purpose of “Breast cancer diagnosis and 
treatment”. 
3.2 Logging of Data Sharing Events to be used 
for Compliance Auditing 
In most of the existing audit approaches, data logging 
usually occurs after performing specific queries to the 
data stored in the database. Unlike these approaches, 
our logging tasks are not executed as database triggers. 
Instead, they are meant to be executed as access control 
systems obligations and would only be triggered if a 
specified access control was permitted. Here, the data 
that is to be logged is same as used/generated by the 
privacy aware access control process.  In particular, the 
logged data consists of the context of the access control 
request and the access control response for all the past 
data access and disclosure that have been allowed by 
the system as well as the time those actions were 
performed. For example, a data sharing can have the 
following context as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3: 
 
Figure 2. Example of a Data Sharing Context Model (instantiated) 
In addition, the following Access Control Decision: 
 
Figure 3. An Example of Data Sharing Decision 
3.3 Generating legal requirements for past 
data sharing events 
Our semantic web rules as presented in [29], [30] are 
compliant with the privacy and data protection 
European law, as they have been designed by explicitly 
translating high-level natural language (English) 
policies interpreted from text law. This has been 
achieved through the use of SWRL [25], [35] rules by 
 
annotating each rule with its reference in a text law. The 
rules allow the reasoning about data sharing context 
information in order to infer the applicable compliance 
information as dictated in high-level policies. Through 
this inference the information or requirement generated 
is being recorded in the ontology as properties of the 
specific case of sharing where its information is given as 
facts to the rule engine. The generated requirements 
could be classified into two sets; enforceable 
requirements and non-enforceable requirements. To 
distinguish between enforceable and non-enforceable 
requirements, we create two disjoint classes in our 
compliance management ontology named 
EnforceableRequirement and 
NonEnforceableRequirement respectively. Both of these 
classes are defined as sub-classes of the 
LegalRequirement class. An example of non-enforceable 
requirement (that could be found in the requirement of 
fair processing represented in article 8 of the European 
directive on data protection [9] indicates that consent 
should be provided in a fair way where the patient was 
not under some kind of threat or pressure when they 
provided their consent. We believe it is hard to 
automatically test for the satisfaction of this requirement. 
Therefore, we consider it as a non-enforceable 
requirement. Moreover, other non-enforceable 
requirements are the ones that are difficult to be enforced 
through a policy-based approach but could be enforced 
through other mechanisms. For example, the 
requirement of complying with high-level policies that 
require the anonymisation of some category of data 
before the data could be shared for research purposes. 
The organization would be required to incorporate data 
anonymisation tools conforming to specific obligations 
in order to be considered compliant. Through the use of 
policy-based approaches, we can only perform a check 
that the data has been anonymised before it could be sent. 
For example, by checking if the data protection status of 
the item to be shared is set to anonymous data. But we 
cannot guarantee that the data has been anonymised. We 
can then consider the specific requirement of 
anonymising the data as difficult to enforce or non-
enforceable. In the light of the above arguments we end 
up with two sets of requirements EReq (Enforceable 
Requirements) and NEReq (Non-Enforceable 




Figure 4. Model of Legal Requirement Hierarchy 
 
We only focus on EReq when we test for matching 
between guidelines and privacy aware access control 
rules.  In the following section, we present the rules we 
use for verifying legal requirements satisfaction. 
3.4 Testing for Requirements Satisfaction 
In the previous section, we have explained how to 
generate legal requirements for a given data sharing 
event selected from the events log. We have also 
showed how our ontology distinguishes between 
enforceable requirements and non-enforceable ones. In 
this section we describe our approach to test for 
requirement satisfaction at the time of requesting a 
data access. In other words, we want to check whether 
the user has complied with legal requirements while 
accessing or disclosing personal data in the past. For 
this purpose, we only need to consider the enforceable 
requirements. In fact, this process is not applicable for 
the non-enforceable requirements.  
 
We adopt a rule-based approach in order to accomplish 
the task of compliance checking. We implement our 
approach through the use of SWRL rules that has as 
antecedent a conjunction of two Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) axioms, for more details on the use 
of ontologies for effective knowledge modelling and 
information retrieval see [13]. As described in Figure 5 
the first axiom is representing a specific legal 
requirement (we call it a requirement axiom), which 
would be generated by executing the group of legal 
requirements rules from our knowledge base and added 
by the rule engine as property of the data sharing 
instance that is subject to audit. The other axiom is an 
OWL axiom testing for the satisfaction of the legal 
requirement (we call it a tester axiom). This axiom does 
already exist as part of the semantics describing the 




Figure 5. Extracting Compliance Knowledge from Business Rules 
 
For example, the OWL axiom HasConsentNecessity( 
DataSharing, Necessity) is presented as follows: 
OWL Axiom : hasConsentNecessity (DataSharing, 
Necessity) 
OWL Property  : HasConsentNecessity  
Property Type  : Object Property  
Property Domain  : DataSharing  
Property Range  :  Necessity  
 
We associate the following OWL axiom: 
consent(DataSharing, Boolean literal) needed for 
testing the satisfaction of the requirements dictated by 
the earlier axiom which models the provision of 
consent for the same case of sharing. 
 
OWL Axiom : consent(DataSharing, Boolean 
literal) 
OWL Property  : Consent 
Property Type  : DataType Property  
 
Property Domain  : DataSharing  
Property Range  :  A value of Boolean type{true, false} 
The consequence part of the rule contains an OWL 
axiom indicating whether the requirement was satisfied. 
We call this the satisfaction axiom.  
 
OWL Axiom :
 ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(DataSharing, Boolean 
literal) 
OWL Property  : ConsentNecessitySatisfaction 
Property Type  : DataType Property  
Property Domain  : DataSharing  
Property Range  :  A value of Boolean type{true, false} 
 
Our SWRL rules will then follow the following template 
named as ‘compliance rule template’: 
T: Requirement Axiom ^ Tester Axiom → Satisfaction 
Axiom 
 
Based on the axioms presented above we can build the 
SWRL rule model which follows the compliance rule 
template described above. This rule checks whether the 
requirement of consent necessity for a specific data 
sharing was satisfied before allowing it to happen in the 
past. The requirement of consent necessity is part of our 
privacy requirements conceptual model (ontology) 
presented in previous work [29]. It is used to model the 
legal obligation with relation to obtaining the patient 
consent before using their medical data. 
R: hasConsentNecessity (?DataSharing, Necessity) 
^ Consent (?DataSharing, Boolean literal) 
 → ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(?DataSharing, Boolean literal) 
Some instantiations of the rule would be as follows: 
• First, for the case where obtaining consent is a 
necessary obligation and where the consent for 
sharing was obtained from the patient before using the 
healthcare information system to disclose the data:  
 
Rule1:  hasConsentNecessity (dataSharing1, Necessary) 
^ Consent (dataSharing1, true) 
→ ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(dataSharing1, true) 
 
• The second instantiation of the rule is for the case 
where the consent is a necessary obligation but it was 
not obtained before the sharing was allowed and 
therefore this requirement was not complied with or 
in other terms has not been satisfied: 
 
Rule2: hasConsentNecessity (dataSharing2, Necessary) 
^ Consent (dataSharing2, false) 
→ ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(dataSharing2, false) 
 
• The third instantiation of the rule is for the case where 
the consent necessity obligation was not implemented 
in the access control policy model used by the 
healthcare data sharing application. By consequent no 
tester axioms were used in the access control rules 
applicable to the sharing context (this is applicable to 
the case of dataSharing1) but it was not obtained 
before the sharing was allowed and therefore this 
requirement was not complied with or in other terms 
has not been satisfied i.e. 
Rule3: hasConsentNecessity (DataSharing1, Necessary) 
→ ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(DataSharing1, false) 
 
We break an instant here to remember the fact that 
OWL is governed by an Open World Assumption. This 
means that the absence of a tester axiom among the 
OWL semantics of the data sharing which is subject to 
reasoning, does not certainly mean that the requirement 
was not satisfied unless we explicitly state this in the 
ontology. Hence, in order to be able to infer that: “if the 
tester axiom is not found therefore the requirement 
would be considered unsatisfied”, we are out to close 
the Open World Assumption through other means. We 
suggest the following assumption and algorithm in 
order to solve the problem:  For the example stated 
above Set-1 will contain: 
 
Rule1:  hasConsentNecessity (dataSharing1, Necessary) 
^ Consent (dataSharing1, true) 
→ ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(dataSharing1, true) 
Rule2: hasConsentNecessity (dataSharing2, Necessary) 
^ Consent (dataSharing2, false) 
→ ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(dataSharing2, false) 
 
And Set-2 will contain: 
 
Rule3: hasConsentNecessity (dataSharing1, Necessary) 
→ ConsentNecessitySatisfaction(dataSharing1, false) 
 
 
Assumption: We distinguish between 2 sets of rules 
(requirements-satisfaction checking rules): 
● Set-1: consists of rules where the antecedent 
contains both clauses (a requirement clause and a 
tester clause) 
● Set-2: consists of rules where the antecedent 
contains only a requirement clause 
 
Algorithm 1: Requirements Satisfaction Testing Algorithm 
 
For each instance of requirement, the rule engine will 
first run Set-1. 
If  any of the rules fire up therefore the engine will 
consider the knowledge inferred by the consequence of 
the rule. 
Else  the engine will run the second set of rules (Set-
2).  
Moving to Set-2 we assume that the tester clause was 
not found among the semantics describing the 
dataSharing context therefore the operational controls 
used to allow this sharing to happen, did not enforce the 
given requirement.  As stated above Set-2 gathers the 
set of rules that allows to infer; for a given requirement; 
a non-satisfaction status. As a result, the engine will set 
the value of requirement satisfaction property to non-
satisfied. 
 
4. The Privacy Compliance Audit Architecture 
The Compliance Management Framework has an audit 
mechanism module. In this regard, Figure 6 provides its 
high-level view, which contains the following 
components: 
 
• Privacy Compliance Audit (PCA): It allows a 
privacy compliance auditor to generate audit reports 
 
about selected data-disclosures recorded in the 
ontology log. The audit report reveals information 
about data disclosure occurrences to the auditing 
officer allowing him to decide on the degree of 
compliance. The data in the report specify the legal 
requirements for complying with privacy legislation 
and whether these requirements were met at the time 
of allowing disclosure of the data (or also called 
policy evaluation time).  
 
• Legal Requirements Generator (LRG): Once 
invoked this component generates a set of legal 
requirements that are relevant to a specified event of 
data sharing. The LRG answers requests from the 
audit component PCA by generating legal 
requirements associated with the facts provided as 
input. The output is a set of OWL axioms of the 
instance of sharing in question describing legal 
requirements applicable. The output is sent back to 
the PCA requestor instead of medical users.   
 
• Requirements Satisfiability Checker (RSC): This 
component will take charge of checking whether the 
set of requirements generated by the legal 
requirements generator LRG were satisfied, before 
allowing it to happen. This is achieved through 
effective assessment of the access control request and 
response produced through the access control policy 
enforcement process. The assessment involves first, 
parsing the properties of the data sharing instance 
described as attributes of the access control policy 
context and then, evaluating them against the set of 
legal requirements generated for the same context. 
Information describing both the access control 
request and answer is saved in the ontology as a 
systematic action of running the jess rule engine on 




Figure 6. High Level Architecture of Compliance Auditing 
Framework 
 
5. Compliance Checking Scenario 
 
In this section we present a use-case scenario built on the 
illustration scenario presented earlier. We are using this 
use-case to show the outcome of the proposed system 
when the use-case is executed for a specified set of 
accessed data and for another context information. We 
consider a set of compliant accesses and also few 
failures cases. In order to perform a routine audit, we 
suppose that a procedure will be in place that would 
allow an auditor to submit an audit query. The query 
aims to generate a list of all the disclosures of a 
mammogram performed the previous month between 
the UK and Italy. As a result, the sharing of the 
mammogram between Dr House and Dr Casa 
(presented in the illustration scenario) was one of the 
returned past disclosures. Recalling more details about 
this data sharing case described before, Dr House has 
obtained an informed consent from Mrs White allowing 
him to share her data with Dr Casa for the purpose of 
obtaining a second opinion for diagnosis and treatment 
procedures. A record of Mrs White’s consent form and 
consent letter was kept in the database along with her 
signature as a proof for compliance with the legal and 
ethical requirement of explicit informed consent. As a 
result, a flag was added in the database indicating that 
explicit informed consent was obtained. At the time of 
disclosure, the following information about the sharing 
operation was generated from the ontology and logged 
in a backlog.  
 
The SWRL rule presented below is the rule responsible 
for inferring the access control decision for the scenario 
described above. The rule states that “When sharing a 
UK patient mammogram between the UK and Italy for 
the purpose of getting a second opinion on treatment; if 
the patient consent has been originally given for breast 
cancer diagnosis and treatment purposes with which the 
purpose of processing is compatible then the sharing is 
allowed and the secondary usage policy of the data 
should be disclosed along with the data” 
 
dataSharing(sharing1) 
∧ hasSender(sharing1, Dr House) 
∧ hasReceiver(sharing1, DrCasa) 
∧ hasPurpose(sharing1, SecondOpinionOnTreatment) 
∧ locatedIn(DrHouse, UK) 
∧ locatedIn(DrCasa, Italy) 
∧ concerning(sharing1,M1) 
∧ belongsTo(M1, UK) 
∧ patientConsent(M1, true) 
∧ hasConsentPurpose(M1, 
BreastCancerDiagnosisAndTreatment) 
∧ compatibleWith(p1, p)  
→  hasSharingDecision(sharing1,allow) 
                              ∧   hasObligation(sharing1, 
attachSecondaryUsePolicy) 
 
Following the approach in [29] which focuses on 
designing the rules for inferring legal requirements; we 
present the rule presented below as an applicable rule 
for our scenario. The rule states: “a specific patient 
consent is necessary for the sharing or the sending of 
UK patient data from the UK”. 
 
dataSharing(?x)    
∧   hasSender(?x, ?s)   
∧   hasReceiver(?x, any)   
∧   locatedIn(?s, UK) 
∧   sharedData(?x, ?d)   
 
∧   belongsTo(?d, UK)   
         →  consentNecessity (?x, Necessary)  
                             ∧ consentSpecificity(?x, SpecificConsent)  
                             ∧ con_Explicitness(?x, any) 
 
 
The auditor can then choose to generate an audit report 
about the selected sharing from the audit backlog. The 
report describes the context of sharing as along with the 
decisions made by the system as a disclosure control 
decision, any obligations that was required from the 
sender or the system. The report includes as well all the 
legal requirements for the audited context of sharing 
and an indication of whether each requirement was 
satisfied or not. Detailed report is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Data sharing Compliance Report.  
Data-Disclosure-ID Legal Requirements Requirement Enforceability Satisfied? Disclosure-Control-Decision 























After examining the data sharing compliance report 
shown in Table 1 the auditor notices that some of the 
legal requirements have not been satisfied however, the 
decision of the access control system was “allow”. For 
this scenario, the sharing would be considered as non-
compliant if and only if the non-satisfied requirements 
are enforceable. If the non-satisfied requirements were 
of type non-enforceable, then the organization or the 
sender of the data will be asked to show other (non-
automated) proofs of compliance. Visiting again our 
example of reports described above in Table 1, the 
requirement that has not been satisfied is the requirement 
of fair consent implementing article 8 principles [9] of 
data protection of the EU Directive [9] and the 
distinguishable purpose for consent required by the EU 
General data protection regulation [10] and minimal data 
processing required by the article 24 of the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation [15],[21],[24]. This 
requirement was set as non-enforceable which means 
that there are no means of enforcing or implementing this 
requirement in an automated way or the means do exist 
but were considered by the hospital as not practical. For 
this case, Dr House or another appointed body from the 
hospital management team will be asked to show other 
non-automated proofs for complying with this 
requirement. The proof for complying with such 
requirements could be the general hospital procedure of 
obtaining consent from patients for example for special 
cases of disclosure i.e. for disclosing patient data outside 
the UK. This procedure would involve the existence of 
two witnesses one from the hospital and one appointed 
by the patient. Both witnesses need to sign a form 
declaring that consent was taken in a fair and lawful way 
where the meaning of fair and lawful consent is 
explained in the consent form.  
 
The audit report for sharing2 highlights two legal 
requirements necessary for the lawfulness of the data 
sharing. These are Consent-for-Primary-Purpose and 
Secondary-Purpose-Compatibility. The Consent-for-
Primary-Purpose represents the legal requirement for 
collecting personal data from patient. As required by 
most national and European regulations patient consent 
should be taken for the collection of private and medical 
data from a patient. The consent should be linked to a 
specific purpose of collection and processing. The 
requirement of Secondary-Purpose-Compatibility is for 
the case where the data is being used for a second 
purpose of processing. As specified in most national 
and European regulation the secondary purpose should 
be compatible with the purpose the patient has 
consented for otherwise a new request of consent is 
necessary. Both generated requirements for sharing2 
where enforceable. In addition, the report indicates that 
both requirements were satisfied by the data sharing 
requestor. Based on these facts the auditor will decide 
that the data sharing was compliant. 
 
7.  Discussion 
Our system could distinguish between enforceable and 
non-enforceable requirements. If the requirement is 
enforceable, the system will check whether it was 
complied with at access control run time. According to 
the received output, an auditor could reflect on whether 
a past data-sharing event would be considered 
compliant with regulations. If the requirement is not 
enforceable, we suggest that the organization should 
provide other proofs for compliance. Our approach is 
built on the use of SWRL rules for specifying: 1) 
privacy aware access control, 2) privacy requirements 
generation and 3) privacy audit rules. These rules were 
tested for correctness and were executed using the JESS 
rule engine [25] plugged in Protégé 3.4 platform [27]. 
The concepts used within the SWRL rules were 
specified in OWL ontologies edited in Protégé 3.4. As 
a result of the execution of the audit rules and more 
precisely the privacy requirement satisfaction rules; the 
satisfaction of the requirements was checked and the 
result was recorded back in the ontology as OWL 
properties of the data sharing event in question.    
 
Our work does not provide a complete automation of 
the process of privacy compliance audit. This is 
because we believe a human intervention is always 
necessary to investigate cases such as checking for 
compliance with non-enforceable requirements. 
Besides, the issue of exposing private data about users 
of the system to be exploited by our audit mechanism 
might raise some privacy preserving concerns.  For the 
 
time being, we have concentrated more on protecting the 
privacy of individuals (patients) their data is stored in 
healthcare systems storage. More work needs to be done 
to insure the auditors are allowed to check only 
necessary information about users who were involved in 
a non-compliant data sharing. It is necessary to minimize 
the amount of data logged in audit logs about users of the 
system and organizations’ employees. Also, it is 
necessary to minimize the amount of exposed data about 
users and employees who were only involved in 
compliant data sharing. For this category of users, no 
further procedures should be taken by the auditor or the 
organisation in order to get them identified. 
Many existing works were found in the literature, which 
seem a big interest in privacy management in healthcare 
[38], [16], [26], [11]. The topics of access control for 
cloud systems in healthcare were broadly tackled for 
example in [5], [1], [3], [40], [43]. The work in [39] 
suggested an enhancement to privacy management 
throw the use of Blockchain. Some works have also 
looked at privacy compliance management and audit 
[18], [19], [4], [23], [42]. To the best of our knowledge 
we couldn’t find in the literature an approach that 
similarly test for compliance with explicitly specified 
requirements dictated by regulations in healthcare. 
However, some interesting issues are still open. First, the 
model of logged data has been designed in a way that 
allow an informative analysis of the data log by auditors. 
With the fact that data logging is a demanding process, 
the model should therefore be optimised in future work 
in order to allow only the necessary data to be recorded. 
Second, high level policies are by nature mutable and 
dynamic. Some of the designed policies in this work 
could either change or be overridden by other newly 
issued policies (dictated by data protection law or by 
other law interfering with the medical and healthcare 
domain as medical law [6]. The impact of these possible 
changes on the outcome of the audit mechanism we are 
proposing in this paper needs to be studied and tackled 
in future work. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of audit for 
the purpose of privacy compliance assurance in 
healthcare heterogeneous domains such as eHealth 
Cloud systems. Particularly, we have introduced a 
framework for privacy compliance checking. It could be 
used for checking if the access control decision making 
has incorporated a proactive verification adherence to 
the requirements dictated by high level legal and ethical 
policies. In a future work, we think this framework 
should be extended to allow only the necessary data to 
be recorded about the users while recording previous 
data sharing events in the audit log. We will be also 
looking on how to allow policy overriding and refreshing 
in order to comply with newly issued data protection 
regulation in the future.  
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